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Ethnographic studies of religion, stuck some-
where between ethnocentrism and literalism,
especially in the case of Islam, have brought
little distinctive anthropological analysis to
bear successfully on the practical realities
and political ideologies of religions. In addi-
tion, the popular assertion that certain ethnic
groups that have had conflicts over centuries
will continue to fight with one another is but
an idea fuelled by numerous media reports
and scholarly publications stressing the his-
torical nature of conflict, much in the same
way as the idea that Islam and modernity are
somehow adversarial. 
Frustratingly, during times of uncertainty,
such essentialist explanations of difference
continue to hold significant weight. As long
as ‘history’ will function as a screen, behind
which the interests of political or religious
leaders are hidden, ethnic or cultural conflict
will continue to appear intractable. Further-
more, there are the modern views of the na-
tion state and all of its institutionalized
mythologies, which over the last hundred
years have confused, erased, desecrated and
demolished our understanding of the local
definitions and categories of group identity
articulated in everyday life. Yet, it is only by
exploring how group political identities are
constructed, by disentangling the relation-
ships between anxiety, threats and group
identity responses, that the paths for conflict
amelioration can be elucidated.
Ger Duijzings’s book tries to raise the
standard of scholarship and addresses some
of the issues outlined above. The introduction
clearly shows a critical reading of the events
and tensions that plagued Kosovo over the
last hundred years. Of great interest are the
details that Duijzings brings to his study of
various seemingly marginal groups in Ko-
sovo; these details shed light on important
facts of identity strategies of interethnic and
interdenominational relations. Duijzings re-
veals the paucity of Western understanding
of Kosovo, which has often been presented as
an area steeped in historical conflict. This
conflict is generally cast as two-sided (Serb
versus Albanian or Orthodox versus Mus-
lim), with two antagonistic groups clashing
and centuries-old hatreds being unleashed.
The prevailing notion that ‘Serbs’ and ‘Alba-
nians’ are distinct and largely antagonistic
groups is not only a simplified version of his-
torical and political facts, but also a national-
ist distortion and represents the outcome of
agitation rather than a description of root
causes of the conflict.
Duijzings argues that Kosovo is not a sim-
ple case of irreconcilably distinct communities
where religion is alleged to play a central role,
but an example of complex, historically in-
formed interchange between loosely defined
‘communities’ on the basis of loosely specified
notions of religious, linguistic and/ or ethnic
identity. While it has become commonplace to
treat Albanian and Muslim cultural identity
as interchangeable, suggesting cultural homo-
geneity, Duijzings documents the different
facets of both Muslim and Albanian identity.
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By deconstructing these ‘communities’, he
confronts the essentialist claim that Serbs
and Albanians are locked in conflict due to
an irreconcilable hostility between Orthodox
Christianity and Islam. Actually, in the Bal-
kans there are considerable cultural criss-
crossings between Islam and Christianity; in
fact, Duijzings makes it clear that the groups
of the region are not historically predisposed
towards conflict. Quite the contrary, the var-
ious religious and ethnic groups reflect con-
tinuous interaction with one another. It was
only after the first Balkan War, in 1912, that
relations between Albanians and Serbs really
turned sour, much of this because the Ser-
bian side proceeded with threats of forced
assimilation, dominance and oppression.
Duijzings’s argument seems to be that there
is after all a great deal more in common be-
tween Serbs and Albanians than one might
suppose, and that the radicalization of Ko-
sovo was not inevitable.
Duijzings persuasively argues that “the
formation and transformation of ethnic and
religious identities is determined by wider
political developments” (p. 22). Identities are
political constructs in which state and reli-
gious regimes play crucial roles in their for-
mation. Instead of regarding religion and
politics as separate domains, Duijzings sees
them as intimately connected formations of
power. In peripheral societies like Kosovo
where the official authority was often only
partial, political and religious elites found
particularly fertile ground for manipulating
ethnic identities. In this aptly defined ‘fron-
tier society’, where ethnic and religious iden-
tifications are flexible, he illustrates how
group boundaries are more fluid and less in-
stitutionalized. Even though local, regional
and religious identities remain very signifi-
cant, the dichotomy between city and coun-
try is notable and ethnic identifications are
linked to religious identity. In addition, state
violence is not unrelated to processes of
identity construction.
Although this is now part of history, as
the processes of ‘ethnic unmixing’ and cre-
ation of stable one-dimensional identities
through violence have eliminated much of
the fluidity and interrelatedness of Kosovo
society, this case is especially instructive.
Duijzings asserts that “Kosovo’s problems
are not ethnic in origin but have been ethni-
cized by political and religious leaders who
want easy political gain” (p. 204). If we con-
tinue to understand the conflicts in the for-
mer Yugoslavia as exclusively ethnic, we will
remain largely blind to the underlying polit-
ical motivations and goals set by the parties
that have the most to gain from conflict. Po-
litical and religious elites attempting to hold
or seize power and prestige can misdirect at-
tention from their efforts by hiding behind
the veil of mass ethnic strife.
The point is not that Duijzings is mount-
ing a counterintuitive argument, but rather
that he shows, especially in his introduction
to the book, that the banal generalizations
which have been endemic and so wide-
spread in the West about the enduring char-
acter of the enmity between Serbs and Alba-
nians (as between Christians and Muslims in
the Balkans) have no basis in fact and that re-
ality is considerably more complex. The as-
sertions that Kosovo’s population has a long
history of sharing cultural traits, which in-
cludes language, religious rites and spatial
identifications will go a long way in dis-
pelling what most authors of the Balkans like
to assert at best as mysteries and at worst as
crude fixations. Duijzings tries to make room
for a more complex understanding of re-
gional identities, beyond the over-simplifica-
tions that often become the interpretative
lens for studying the Yugoslav wars. As re-
viewers have noticed,1 the very fact that Duij-
zings so intently tries to demonstrate cross-
cultural contact taking place in a number of
localities is indicative of how much these fix-
ations dominate the literature. It is time to
toss these misconstructions in the theoretical
and empirical garbage bin of nonsense. Un-
fortunately, it is only now that ethnogra-
phers and social scientists have started to
produce articulate challenges to these haz-
ardous and dangerous myths.
Though religion constitutes just one factor
among many that contribute to the develop-
ment of a sense of belonging to a larger group,
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most identity scholars consider it an identity
marker that divides one group from another.
The practice of religions, like any cultural
marker, is a ritual linked to the historical con-
tingencies of a particular moment. Religious
practices in the Balkans have shifted over
time, altering the definitions of group identity.
Duijzings’s (2000: 106–31) work is particularly
useful in deconstructing the notion of a mono-
lithic Islamic identity in the region. By tracing
the internal divisions between the Albanian
dervish orders and the Bosnian ulemas (the of-
ficially sanctioned Islamic Association) in the
former Yugoslavia, he shows that what spe-
cialists of the literature call ‘Balkan Islam’
(Popovic 1986, Bougarel and Clayer 2001) is
instead manifested in a complicated variety of
expressions that give rise to a number of iden-
tities. Duijzings reminds us that for Albanians
“religion is almost irrelevant in official politi-
cal life” (2000: 159); that Albanian nationalism
is not clothed in religious terms; and that Ko-
sovo’s Muslims were never supported by
Muslims from elsewhere in the former Yugo-
slavia or in the Balkans. This challenges the
notion that knowing an individual’s religious
identity would facilitate placing that person
within a given ethnic identification or conflict.
Duijzings draws attention to the political
realities exacerbating the differences be-
tween religious groups in former Yugoslavia.
First and foremost, he documents a split
among Muslims in Kosovo, that is, between
those who turn towards Sarajevo as the cen-
ter for religious guidance, and those who do
not. The former are often referred to as ‘Mus-
lim Slavs’ associated with Bosnian Muslims
to the north; they speak Serbian as their
mother tongue and do not consider them-
selves to be ethnically Albanian. There is a
second split among Muslims along the con-
fessional Sunni/Shiite divide. Yet, Sunni
Islam is associated with the Muslim Slavs of
Sarajevo. The Islamic Association wielded all
the political power from Sarajevo, while the
dervish orders were largely based in under-
developed rural areas that had fared badly at
the end of the Balkan wars and conclusion of
each world war. Not surprisingly, Kosovo
sheiks conducted open polemics in the 1970s
and resisted efforts by Sarajevo Islamic au-
thorities to weaken the dervish orders in Ko-
sovo. These polemics only subsided when
federal state authorities intervened in 1979.
The fact that Bosnian Muslims generally pre-
ferred to marry Bosnian Croats or Serbs in-
stead of Albanian Muslims is symptomatic of
the same state of affairs.
If some specialists in the area consider the
opposition between Albanian popular Sufism
in Kosovo and a Slavic orthodox Sunni Islam
in Bosnia as a ‘distorted caricature’ (Clayer),
the contradictions are indeed deeply rooted,
going far beyond specialist conceptions caught
in a mixture of literalism and a dreadful sta-
tisticizing which means absolutely nothing.
These contradictions have rather a political,
social and moral significance, which are better
expressed in ethnic or religious discourses. As
Bosnian Muslims held privileged positions re-
garding Islamic matters under the Yugoslav
system, the proliferation of Sufism in Kosovo
can be interpreted as an attempt by Albanian
Muslims to reassert their autonomy in the
religious sphere. In discourses related to Mus-
lim religious revival, be it confraternal or oth-
erwise, one recurrently finds nationalist mo-
tives, which better illustrate the necessity of
considering such a powerful mobilizing force
in the role that religious leaders claim they
play in this field.
Yet, in the last two chapters, Duijzings at-
tempts a comparative textual analysis of
what he asserts are Albanian and Serbian ex-
amples of how religious symbolisms infil-
trate ‘national’ imaginations. He argues that
Albanian nationalists at one time might have
attempted to infuse their cause with reli-
gious elements largely drawn from Bek-
tashism. In particular, from elements drawn
from a long epic poem in twenty-five cantos
entitled Qerbelaja (first published in 1898),
which retells the saga of Shiism by the well-
known nineteenth-century Albanian poet
Naim Frashëri.
Naim Frashëri was one of the most emi-
nent thinkers and leading figures of Albanian
Bektashism, Albanian romanticism and Al-
banian national movement. His Bektashi epic
has to be judged in the context of another
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monumental epic, the History of Skanderbeg,
in which Frashëri narrates the exploits, suc-
cesses and failures of the Albanian national
hero against the Ottoman invaders, and
which is held to be his most famous and
greatest poetic aspiration. Even though both
were published the same year and were writ-
ten in the same style, one grounded on Mus-
lim mythology and Eastern mysticism, the
other on Classic mythology and Christian
symbolism, it is only the latter epic that be-
came the poem of Albanian national pride.
The martyrs of Karbala, quite contrary to his-
torical evidence and Eastern tradition, owe
much to the heroism of the romantic era, in-
cluding Frashëri’s own poetic portray of
Skanderbeg (Norris 1993: 182).
In the formulation and argumentation of
nationalist ideology, Frashëri made use of
both religious and realist, pantheist and gnos-
tic conceptions, coming from both Eastern
and Western traditions. Among other things,
he openly suggested and theorized the recon-
ciliation of religion with the idea of the na-
tion. However, it is an exaggeration to argue,
as Duijzings (p. 167) does, that Naim Frashëri
attempt has been to bridge the religious di-
vide of Albanians by proposing Bektashism
as the national religion of Albanians. This
view seems to stem from an uncritical re-
liance on eclectic compilations of literary his-
tories (e.g. Mann 1955, Elsie 1995) found
throughout Duijzings’s book. The Bektashis,
in spite of their concentration in Albania,
were a small minority quite marginalized
within Albanian society, especially before the
spread of national movement. Naim Frashëri
was certainly not blind to this fact. The rela-
tionship of religion and national ideas in
Frashëri’s conceptions has been very often
uncritically investigated by scholars camped
on both sides of either religious (Qazimi 1996)
or nationalist (Xholi 1998) lines. There is rea-
son to believe, however, that Naim Frashëri
intended not so much to provide Albanians
with a unique religion, but rather make na-
tionalist ideas successfully acceptable to Al-
banians of whatever religious affiliation.
The problem, however, is not so much
whether this has been, as Duijzings argues, a
failed attempt to bridge the religious divide
between Albanians by promoting a secular
national cause that incorporates some het-
erodox Bektashi elements within it. Taking
Naim Frashëri’s epic reproduction of the Bat-
tle of Karbala and situating it on comparative
grounds with such a state- and church-pro-
duced body of literature that re-creates and
embellishes the Kosovo Battle mythology in
Serbia, as Duijzings (pp. 157–202) does, is in
itself a problematic issue in methodological
and analytical terms. Duijzings finds both
have much in common: each have been por-
trayed through epic song and folk verse,
both record a lost battle where righteous
forces were overcome by evil ones, and the
main hero was sacrificed, leading to the ne-
cessity for followers to accept suffering as a
step to redemption and a revolt against
tyranny. Overall, Duijzings believes both lent
similar weight to the growth of Albanian and
Serbian nationalisms respectively during the
nineteenth century.
Still, as some reviewers note, excepting
the partly religious nature of both myths,
they cannot be compared, either in terms of
content or their elaboration and diffusion.
Duijzings recognizes the lack of a deeply
rooted cultural tradition for the failure of
Naim Frashëri’s epic to become a political
symbol in Albanian nationalism. In contrast,
what has made the Kosovo Battle myth so
extremely powerful is its making rooted in
folklorism and the church culture of Serbian
nationalism. Duijzings has correctly under-
stood it this way as suggested in his chapter
on the Serbian folk-epic of Kosovo (pp.
176–202). Although the Kosovo myth was
created in Serbia and never resonated in
Kosovo itself, throughout the twentieth cen-
tury it provided for Serbs a set of roles with
which to sort out into proper categories am-
biguous or overlapping identities in Kosovo.
The Serbian Kosovo myth and epic poetry
grew out of elaboration of oral and church
traditions; their religious content was closely
tied to the culture harbored by the Orthodox
Church, a powerful institution always influ-
ential in Serbian nationalist ideology. Actu-
ally, even after the downfall of communism
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and federalism in Yugoslavia, the Serbian
Orthodox Church revitalized nationalism by
carrying Lazar’s bones around Serbia for re-
consecration. Relations between church and
state were enormously strengthened. Even
the military murderers were transformed
into heroes through epic songs, a process
aptly labeled as ‘gusle laundering’ (p. 199),
while Serb paramilitary leaders were com-
pared to Milosh Obilic, the main hero of the
Kosovo Battle. 
Moreover, not only is the tendency to
equate Serbian and Albanian nationalisms
unjustified, it is also actually a dangerous am-
bush in which Serbian nationalist agitators
are still trying to entrap public and scholarly
opinions. The political instrumentality of the
Serbian myths of the Battle of Kosovo is not
exactly commensurable with Naim Frashëri’s
Qerbelaja, but rather with other types of po-
litical folklorism and pseudo-culturalist proj-
ects, serving either chauvinistically or ideo-
logically charged nationalisms. Examples of
this sort could be found, for instance, in the
communist propaganda of Eastern and Cen-
tral Europe when cultural and folkloric tra-
ditions have been instrumental for justifying
and magnifying the ‘authentic’ foundations
of the political and ideological regime, as I
have shown elsewhere for the case of com-
munist Albania (Doja 1998). Other anthro-
pologists have suggested a similar argument
(e.g. Gossiaux 1995). Another parallel with
the Serbian Kosovo mythologies can be
found in Hitler’s propaganda campaign of
1930s and early 1940s when German Volks-
kunde traditions have been instrumental in
promoting the sinisterly reputed Nazi ideol-
ogy. But to compare Frashëri’s national ide-
ology to Serbian nationalism, as Duijzings
does, is like comparing Herder’s romanti-
cism to Hitler’s national socialism!
On the other hand, while the Battle of Ko-
sovo was instrumental for Serbian national-
ism as the mythologizing and embellish-
ment of a local, historical and factual reality,
Naim Frashëri uses the drama of Karbala as
a local and historical metaphor of a mythic
and ethical world view. In this sense, the
relational parallel between Albanian and
Serbian national ideology, if any, seems to be
in difference instead of similarity. There are
two different, opposed conceptualizations
that give way, after instrumental transforma-
tions, to a number of single utterances,
which share some similar details in style and
content but are irrelevant for any relational
comparison. When you compare such single
utterances then, you do not compare them on
a superficial, linear one-to-one basis, but only
with respect to their relative setting in the
whole field of constructed nationalisms, and
their relative difference or similarity with all
other relevant actual occurrences within the
same field. Both types of transformations are
variants of the same pattern, but there are dif-
ferences in the form and content of their con-
ceptualization of prerequisites and outcomes.
What is lacking here is the analytical and an-
thropological insight to understand that the
poetic and intellectual speculations of Naim
Frashëri, retelling the saga of Shiism as the
religion of victims of persecution, are rele-
vant because they have been instrumental in
shaping theological ideas with gnostic, dual-
ist and pantheist conceptions that would
have reasonably made it possible for the Bek-
tashi religion to have entangled with Alban-
ian national ideology.
Nevertheless, Duijzings’s book is most
welcome, especially its introduction, even
though it seems not sufficiently grounded in
the empirical work related to the chapters
that follow. As some reviewers have re-
marked, while some chapters go back twelve
years, the introduction was the last and most
polished thing that Duijzings wrote for this
collection. Though the introduction can ini-
tially excite the reader, the rest of the book
can disappoint since the sophistication and
intellectual maturity exhibited in the intro-
duction is clearly lacking in much that fol-
lows. In fact, the initial excitement may en-
courage the reader to neglect the rich material
that could have been present. The underly-
ing problem with the entire collection is its
problematic methodology, which often seems
to favor a reliance on a flawed body of sec-
ondary literature rather than a combination
of extensive fieldwork and a critical reading
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of sources. This is regretful as in the intro-
duction Duijzings goes to great lengths to ar-
ticulate a dynamic in the region that is com-
pletely at odds with what much of the
literature of the past promotes.
Perhaps this is due to the fact that this is
not a book in the classical sense; as Duijzings
states in the preface, “this book is not the one
I initially intended to write” (p. ix). In the
early 1990s his research project considered
what seemed to be a stable community, Let-
nica, a Catholic, ethnic-Croat enclave in Ko-
sovo near Macedonia. The discussion about
Letnica, however, is restricted to just the first
chapter of his book (pp. 37–64). His ambi-
tious project probably suffered from the
accelerated events in Kosovo during the
Milosevic era, when nearly the entire Croat
population of Letnica became refugees in
Croatia. Thus, as it has been suggested, the
uneven quality of presentation and argument
among the case studies discussed in the book
may be largely due to the fact that Duijzings
was only able to do extensive fieldwork in
just this one case. Certainly, the unfortunate
realities of the 1990s linked to the nature of
identity politics might have changed dramat-
ically the project of many anthropologists,
though not necessarily for all of them.
Sifting through a body of secondary sources
Duijzings forcibly tries to fit the material into
what he correctly knows about the nature of
identity. Unfortunately, his over-reliance on
the work of both respected Balkan commen-
tators such as Hasluck (1929) and Malcolm
(1998) is unhealthy. Both produced some of
the best professional secondary resources
you could hope to use for Kosovo. However,
to assume authority while making unsub-
stantiated statements is a dangerous trap
that Duijzings might have clearly under-
stood. They cannot provide us the analytical
foundation for what has been, ultimately in
their case, an attempt to historicize a phe-
nomenon that today is rather difficult to
monitor anthropologically. In addition, while
some reviewers have noted that his analysis
seems to be problematic as far it is based not
on field observations, but on an old second-
ary literature which does not give sufficient
details and makes the comparison difficult
(Clayer), others point that it is remarkable
how many authoritative sources are totally
ignored in parts of Duijzings’s book (Norris).
However, Duijzings’s scholarship runs es-
pecially into trouble when he relies heavily on
local publications, from newspapers to post-
1986 Serbian ‘social science’, which makes the
reading of his case studies terribly frustrat-
ing, as he uses too often these politically
charged and blatant propaganda sources to
substantiate realities that are central to his ar-
gument. This is especially evident in his brief
discussion of ‘the making of Egyptians’ in
Kosovo and Macedonia (pp. 132–56). Even
though some reviewers believe that “this
short chapter alone conveys and explains the
transience and political function of identity
in the Balkans better than most of the volu-
minous tomes on the subject” (Bellamy), oth-
ers aptly point out that Duijzings relies ex-
cessively on the nationalist discourse by
journalists and scholars, which “reflects a
dangerous process of legitimizing ‘points of
view’ when they are in fact scandalously
false and contrived” (Blumi). More impor-
tantly, some classic and very dangerous na-
tionalist mythologies (especially those that
are all too often referenced with no qualifica-
tion in Duijzings’s book, such as the Serbian
fascist propaganda about Albanian efforts to
force assimilation) promulgate accusations
that have never been substantiated with doc-
umentary evidence and fly in the face of his-
tory. As with much of this type of literature,
these assertions are typically made by people
whose authority stems from their political al-
legiance to nationalist projects. Duijzings
himself is far too careful to outwardly sub-
scribe to the premise of theories of this kind.
Nevertheless, by incorporating this material
so heavily into the content, the impact on his
analysis is blurred and confused. The danger
of adopting this flawed literature while at-
tempting to contribute to the study of shift-
ing identity is that it implicitly accepts the
foundation – if not the content – of highly
distorted suppositions.
In that context, instead of subscribing to
charges of Albanian ‘hegemony’ and ‘genocide’ (!)
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there are far more productive and helpful ways
of exploring individual motivations and cul-
tural consequences of adopting one particular
identity or another. A related problem, I sus-
pect, might be this regrettable tendency of
British and American publishers to tolerate a
good deal of literature written by authors who
are not fluent in the necessary languages, but
who nonetheless seem to think that by dressing
their stuff up as ‘political science’ they will
somehow attain greater wisdom. Duijzings
knows Serbo-Croat (he teaches Serbo-Croat
Studies in London), but probably not Albanian
as he himself suggests while acknowledging
the translation of some original texts by one of
his Albanian students (p. 173). Certainly, you
can negotiate your own way through Kosovo
speaking Serbo-Croat, but if you also lack ex-
tensive fieldwork, this becomes a considerable
shortcoming as anyone listening to an Albanian
muhabet in Kosovo’s cafés will have a better
chance of knowing what is truly going on.
What is clear, however, is that Duijzings is
at his best when he does not depend on sec-
ondary literature but is informed by his own
fieldwork and an intimate knowledge of the
situation on the ground. A focus on marginal
activities at the grassroots level helps Duij-
zings make important observations about
the nature of identity and the role of religion
in conflict and cohesion in Kosovo. By con-
sidering examples of identity development
in Kosovo that most Western scholars over-
look, several of the studies – in one way or
another – demonstrate the incomplete nature
of identity conversion.
For instance, he examines ethnically mixed
pilgrimages and ambiguous sanctuaries as a
laboratory of identity, where you can see
both fission and fusion at work. In such reli-
gious events Catholics, Orthodox and Mus-
lims come together at each other’s sanctuar-
ies and shrines, and rituals are shared and
group identities are blurred. While showing
that Catholic and Muslim Albanians have
enjoyed largely unproblematic relations, he
describes the history of crypto-Catholicism
in Kosovo and explains how it united Alba-
nians, making Islam and Christianity both
part of their common identity. He can also
talk knowledgeably about Albanian der-
vishes, the revival of popular Sufism and the
Bektashis. The latter, a religious brotherhood
that is dominant in Albania, is also present in
Kosovo and Western Macedonia.
Finally, all of these cases together with its
introduction make of this book an original
contribution to the literature on identity pol-
itics in the Balkans, making it possible to elu-
cidate contemporary problems of national-
ism. Rather than casting ethnic conflict as a
retreat to ‘ancient hatreds’, this book views
these violent moments as social rupture, thus
providing insight into the motivations and
political formations that rush into the vacu-
ums accompanying social dislocations. Ideas
about ethnic separation were transmitted by
religious/political elites and reproduced in
the form of group identity formation. The di-
vides between Serb and Albanian as between
Christian and Muslim were contingent upon
the immediate nature of social threats and
the political-social dislocations that accom-
panied them.
Note
1. Duijzings’s book is reviewed in an impres-
sive number of scholarly and other journals,
including: Southeast European Politics, 1(2),
2000: pp. 126–30 (Isa Blumi); Canadian Sla-
vonic Papers, 42(4), 2000: pp. 591–2 (Lohr E.
Miller); Islamochristiana 26, 2000: pp. 273–4
(Maurice Borrmans); Religion, State & Society,
29(1), 2001: pp. 67–8 (Sabrina P. Ramet); Inter-
national Affairs, 77(1), 2001, 197 (Alex J. Bel-
lamy); The Review of International Affairs, 1(1),
2001: pp. 103–5 (Norman Stone); Journal of
Southern Europe & the Balkans, 3(2), 2001,
206–7 (Julia Mitric); Balkanologie, 5(1–2), 2001:
pp. 304–8 (Nathalie Clayer); Slavic Review,
60(3), 2001: pp. 634–5 (Julie Mertus); Slavonic
& East European Review, 79(4), 2001: pp. 791–2
(Antonia Young); Ethnic and Racial Studies,
24(5), 2001: pp. 874–5 (Hugh Poulton); Ethnic
and Racial Studies, 25(2), 2002: pp. 349– 50
(Vjeran Pavlakovic); Nations and Nationalism,
8(1), 2002: pp. 128–29 (Stefan Ihrig); Journal of
Islamic Studies, 13(2), 2002: pp. 225–27 (Harry
T. Norris); International Politics, 39(2), 2002:
pp. 235–38 (Jeffrey S. Murer).
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